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Abstract I show that the infelicity of disjunctions in which one disjunct entails
the other (“Hurford disjunctions”), as well as the felicity of a subclass of Hurford
disjunctions (e.g., some or all), can be derived from a general principle of Brevity
under the independently motivated assumption that uncertainty implicatures are
generated in the grammar.
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1 Introduction
I want to begin by comparing two minimally different assertions:
(1) a. Mary drank some of the beers.
b. Mary drank some or all of the beers.
The Venn-diagram in Figure 1 depicts the set of situations in which the two sentences
are true (I will use SOME/ALL as transparent abbreviations for whole sentences).
ALL SOME
Figure 1 Semantic relation between propositions in (1)
As the diagram illustrates, (1a) and (1b) are semantically equivalent under any
standard semantics for or (e.g., logical ∨). Our locus of comparison, by contrast,
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will be the pragmatics. More specifically, it is the predictions of the two major
schools of thought on implicature: the Neo-Gricean theory on the one hand, and the
grammatical theory of scalar implicatures on the other hand.
Consider the predictions of the Neo-Gricean theory first. Under this theory,
implicatures arise after semantic computation, through competition of what has been
asserted to what could have been asserted, given language-independent constraints.
To be precise:
(2) Neo-Gricean Cooperative Principle
The speaker should assert α instead of φ if:
a. α is relevant in C
b. JαK⊊ JφK
c. α ∈ALT(φ)
d. the speaker is certain that α (which we will abbreviate as K(α))
Following Katzir (2007), I take (2c) to be definable in terms of syntactic complexity,
as spelled out below (simplifying Katzir’s proposal slightly):
(3) Formal Alternatives ALT (Katzir 2007)
If a structure α can be derived from φ by substituting terminal nodes in φ
with lexical items or with subconstituents of φ , or by deleting subconstituents
of φ , then α ∈ ALT(φ)
Let us quickly review the well-known predictions that emerge for the original simple
sentence SOME in (1a). The condition in (2c) rules out competition of this sentence
with the alternative in (4b), while allowing competition with the universal alternative
ALL in (4a):1
1 The question as to how pragmatic competition can be restricted in this way is known as the Symmetry
Problem. The Neo-Gricean solution has the form of an ad absurdum argument: suppose there was no
restriction that α ∈ALT(φ) as defined by (3). Then (1) would compete with both alternatives (0a)
and (0b) — both are equally relevant and more informative:
(i) Mary drank some of the beers.
a. Mary drank all of the beers.
b. Mary drank some but not all of the beers.
Via the Cooperative Principle, the following uncertainty implicatures would be predicted:
(ii) a. ¬ K (Mary drank all of the beers)
b. ¬ K (Mary drank some but not all of the beers)
As we will see shortly, however, these two uncertainty implicatures make it impossible to derive a
scalar implicature of the form K ¬(ALL). But (1) does give rise to this scalar implicature. Therefore,
so the argument, these cannot both be competing alternatives.
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(4) Mary drank some of the beers.
a. Mary drank all of the beers. ✓
b. Mary drank some but not all of the beers. 8
Given that (4a) is not only part of ALT but also meets the other conditions in (2),
the only reason a cooperative speaker would not assert it must be the last condition
of the Cooperative Principle ((2d)). The result of this reasoning is an implicature:
(5) Mary drank some of the beers.↝ ¬ K (Mary drank all of the beers)
The speaker is not certain that Mary drank all of the beers
K is a universal operator quantifying over the speaker’s doxastic alternatives. At this
point, it will be useful to introduce the following terminology:
(6) Inventory of Implicatures
a. Uncertainty: ¬ K α
b. Ignorance: ¬ K α ∧ ¬ K ¬α
c. Scalar: K ¬α
Thus, an uncertainty implicature ¬Kα makes a weak statement in that it is consistent
with two kinds of situations: those in which the speaker is certain that α is false (=
K¬α), and those situations in which the speaker’s alternatives contain both α- and¬α-worlds (= ¬Kα ∧ ¬K(¬α)).
Is the uncertainty implicature in (5) empirically adequate? Perhaps. More
importantly at this point, the scalar implicature which the sentence undoubtedly
can have is not yet derived. Next to the Cooperative Principle and the structural
definition of ALT , it is the third standard ingredient in the Neo-Gricean account
which will derive this:
(7) Epistemic Step (Sauerland 2004)
Given the assertion of φ in context C, and the associated uncertainty impli-
catures ¬Kα1, . . . , ¬Kαn, ¬Kαk can be strengthened into K(¬αk) only if the
result is consistent with the sum of all uncertainty implicatures of φ in C and
Kφ
The Epistemic Step, then, describes the third and final step in the pragmatic impli-
cature computation. Whether the hearer takes this step is dependent on contextual
considerations about the speaker’s state of mind (see Soames 1982):
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(8) Opinionated Speaker
A speaker is opinionated about α if it holds that Kα ∨ K¬α
The uncertainty implicature ¬Kα combined with the assumption that the speaker is
opinionated logically entails the scalar implicature K¬α . In other words, a hearer
who has derived an uncertainty implicature and furthermore assumes the speaker to
be opinionated will take the Epistemic Step iff the consistency requirements given in
(7) are met. Summing up, the simple sentence (1a) is predicted to have either a weak
implicature ¬KALL — if the hearer does not assume the speaker to be opinionated
— or else a scalar implicature K ¬(ALL).
Having the three essential building blocks of the theory in place — the Coop-
erative Principle, the definition of structural alternatives ALT , and a strengthening
mechanism like the Epistemic Step — we can check what this theory would predict
for the more complex sentence SOME OR ALL in (1b). As illustrated in Figure 1,
this sentence is semantically equivalent to the simpler version SOME. Therefore,
it will have the same competing alternative as the simpler sentence, namely, ALL.
This alternative fulfills all conditions of the cooperative principle, in particular, it
is structurally less complex and thus part of ALT (SOME OR ALL). In the by now
familiar fashion, we can derive the following uncertainty implicature:
(9) Mary drank some or all of the beers.↝ ¬ K (ALL)
Crucially, now, we can even take the Epistemic Step:
(10) K(SOME or ALL) ∧ ¬ K(ALL) ∧ K ¬(ALL) ✓
There is simply nothing in the theory which would prevent this scalar implicature.
Needless to say, this is a wrong result: the complex sentence SOME OR ALL can
never give rise to this scalar implicature. In conclusion, then, the prediction of the
Neo-Gricean theory regarding the difference between SOME and SOME OR ALL
is that both are not only semantically equivalent, but may even give rise to the
same (scalar) implicature, contrary to fact (this observation has also been made
independently in Alonso-Ovalle (2006: 56ff.)).
Let us now turn to the predictions of the grammatical theory, of which I take Fox
(2007) to be the standard version. Fox rejects the idea that pragmatic competition
is subject to the brevity condition in (2c). The Cooperative Principle therefore
becomes:
(11) Fox-Grice Cooperative Principle
The speaker should assert α instead of φ if:
a. α is relevant in C
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b. JαK⊊ JφK
c. K α
Crucially, this version of the Cooperative Principle no longer allows the strengthening
of the Epistemic Step, i.e., derivation of scalar implicatures from simple sentences
like Mary drank some of the beers if we assume that all other building blocks of the
Neo-Gricean theory remain intact. The problem is the symmetry of alternatives (see
fn. 1). (11) predicts that SOME will compete will all relevant stronger alternatives, i.e.
SOME BUT NOT ALL and ALL (see (4)). This will result in two kinds of uncertainty
implicatures:
(12) a. ¬ K (Mary drank all of the beers)
b. ¬ K (Mary drank some but not all of the beers)
But these cannot be strengthened into scalar implicatures: if the speaker is certain of
his original assertion (= KSOME), and if he were certain that Mary didn’t drink all of
the beers (K ¬(ALL)), it would follow that he is certain that Mary drank some but not
all of the beers (=KSOME BUT NOT ALL). But this contradicts the second uncertainty
implicature ¬KSOME BUT NOT ALL, and therefore violates the consistency condition
on the Epistemic Step. What we are left with is a strengthening of a different kind:
(13) and (12b) together with the assertion entail that the speaker is truly ignorant
with respect to stronger alternatives:
(13) ¬ K (Mary drank all of the beers) & ¬ K ¬(Mary drank all of the beers)
Summarizing this intermediate result, under the view advocated in Fox (2007), the
simple sentence SOME (see (1a)) may give rise to a true ignorance implicature as
in (13). Pragmatic reasoning alone will never give rise to a scalar implicature. It is
at this point that the theory becomes grammatical: scalar implicatures are in fact
derived in the semantics, through a covert exhaustivity operator exh (see Chierchia
(2006); Fox (2007)):
(14) Jexh φ K = φ & ∀α ∈ IE(φ ,ALTφ) ∶ ¬α
Importantly, the set of formal alternativesALT and, consequently its subset IE(φ ,ALT)
of innocently excludable alternatives is defined exactly as in the Neo-Gricean theory,
i.e. in terms of syntactic complexity. Simplifying, an alternative α is innocently
excludable if it can be negated without logical contradiction:
(15) IE(φ ,ALTφ) = {ψ ∣ JφK⊊ JψK∧ ¬∃ψ ′ ∈ALT(φ) s.t. (JφK∩ J¬ψK) ⊆ Jψ ′K}
Given the availability of the operator exh, the original simple sentence (1a) is
structurally ambiguous between two different LFs, the semantics of which are given
below:
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(16) a. Jexh SOMEK = SOME ∧ ¬ALL
b. JSOMEK = SOME
Suppose we chose the second LF in (16b). Once the sentence is sent off to the
pragmatics, it will compete with the two stronger symmetric alternatives seen in (12)
with the result reviewed above, namely, a true ignorance implicature:
(17) Mary drank some of the beers↝ ¬ K (ALL) ∧ ¬ K ¬ (ALL)
For the LF in (16a), on the other hand, there is no equally relevant, stronger alterna-
tive, so that there will be no pragmatic implicatures for this LF.
Let us now check the predictions of the grammatical theory for the more complex
sentence in(1b), repeated again below:
(18) Mary drank some or all of the beers. (= SOME OR ALL)
Suppose we adjoin exh to this sentence. As illustrated below, this would result in the
same false prediction as the pragmatic theory, namely, that the complex sentence
could give rise to the scalar implicature that Mary did not drink all of the beers:
(19) Jexh SOME or ALLK=ALT = {SOME, ALL}
IE = {ALL}
= SOME ∧ ¬ ALL 8
As opposed to the pragmatic theory, however, the grammatical theory has a way to
avoid this false prediction. The solution comes from a well-known constraint on
disjunctions, first discussed and named after Hurford (1974):
(20) Hurford’s Constraint (HC)
A disjunction in which one disjunct entails the other is ill-formed
Quite obviously, ALL entails SOME. Given the generalization in (20), we are thus
left wondering why the corresponding sentences like our original (1b) are felicitous.
The grammatical theory’s answer to (19) likewise entails an answer to this puzzle:
there is an LF which complies with (20):
(21) [exh SOME] or [ALL]
In this structure, the exhaustivity operator is embedded inside the first disjunct. The
first disjunct will therefore no longer entail ALL:
(22) J[exh SOME] or [ALL]K = (SOME∧¬ALL) ∨ ALL≡ SOME
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Given the constraint in (20), the LF in (21) will be the only available structure for
the complex sentence, yielding the semantics given above. What, then, are the
predicted pragmatic implicatures for this structure? The set of relevant and stronger
alternatives is given below — note the parallelism to the simple LF SOME in (16b):
(23) ALTP = {SOME but not ALL, ALL}
As is familiar by now, this set of alternatives will give rise to ignorance implicatures:
(24) [exh SOME] or ALL↝ ¬K ALL ∧ ¬K¬ALL
These are exactly the same (pragmatic) implicatures as are predicted to arise for
the simpler sentence SOME, as reviewed above. Thus, the grammatical theory
predicts that both sentences may be completely equivalent both semantically and
pragmatically. The predictions are summarized below:
(25) Neo-Gricean Theory of Implicatures
a. SOME
Uncertainty Implicature ¬K(ALL), Scalar implicature K¬(ALL)
b. SOME or ALL
Uncertainty Implicature ¬K(ALL), *Scalar implicature K¬(ALL)
(26) Grammatical cum pre-Neo-Gricean Theory of Implicatures
a. SOME
Ignorance Implicature ¬K(ALL) ∧ ¬K¬(ALL), Scalar implicature K¬(ALL)
b. SOME or ALL
Ignorance Implicature ¬K(ALL) ∧ ¬K¬(ALL)
2 Grammatical uncertainty implicatures
In this section I will introduce the basics of a new grammatical theory of implicature
(see Meyer (2013)). The idea is that all implicatures — including uncertainty and
ignorance implicatures — are derived through exhaustification in the grammar. First,
we assume that all assertively used sentences are in fact covertly modalized by an
underlying (possibly evidential) operator which I call the Matrix K operator:
(27) Matrix K Axiom
Assertion of φ by S is parsed as Ksφ at LF
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As before I will usually leave out the subscript s since K is interpreted relative
to the speaker by default. Again, just as before, K is a universal quantifier over
belief-worlds.
When combined with the general availability of exhaustification at propositional
nodes, the Matrix K Axiom allows for different scopal orderings between exh and
K at the level of logical form. Independent (pragmatic) principles are expected to
systematically restrict these possibilities. In the basic version of the theory outlined
here, we have only one pragmatic principle:
(28) Epistemic Transparency (ET)
An LF of the form [ . . . Kxφ ] is licensed iff it entails x’s epistemic attitude
about every ψ ∈ALT(φ)
Before checking the predictions of this principle, it should be noted that structural
alternatives ALT are defined as before, in terms of Katzir’s notion of structural
complexity (see (3) above). To this I add an additional restriction on the algorithm
deriving ALT :2
(29) Restriction on ALT
DELETE & REPLACE may not target the K operator
Let us now go through some examples on how to apply the structural definition ofALT in a system with Matrix K and (embedded) exh. When exh is adjoined only
once, above K, the formal alternatives it quantifies over are as expected:
(30) exh K [A or B]ALT = {K A, K B, K [A and B]}
When one exhaustivity operator is in the scope of another, there will in principle be
more alternatives which exh could negate:
(31) exh2 K exh1 [A or B]ALT1 = { K exh1 A, K exh1 B, K exh1 [A and B], K A, K B, . . . }
The basics of the theory can now be applied to a few examples. Consider the
following LFs:
(32) a. K [A or B]
b. K SOME
2 Ultimately, this restriction should be derived from independent facts about the Matrix K operator, but
here I will make do with the stipulation in (29).
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If these were licensed, a simple disjunction or a simple sentence SOME would be
predicted to be felicitous if the speaker is certain that A AND B is true, or if she
is certain that ALL. The principle of Epistemic Transparency correctly rules out
these LFs. This is because they don’t entail an epistemic attitude about the relevant
alternatives, e.g., A AND B and ALL.
What are licensed LFs in the theory? We will start with a simple disjunction.
There are exactly two kinds of LFs which will be licensed:3
(33) LF 1
exh K [A or B]
= K(A∨B)∧¬K(A)∧¬K(B)∧¬K(A∧B)
(34) LF 2
exh K exh [A or B]
= K(A∨B)∧¬K(A)∧¬K(B)∧K¬(A∧B)
The only difference between these two LFs is the attitude entailed about the corre-
sponding conjunction: while LF 1 entails an uncertainty implicature about [A and
B], LF 2 entails the scalar implicature that the speaker is certain that [A and B] is
false. Note that LF 3 violates Epistemic Transparency because it doesn’t entail any
attitude about the relevant alternatives:
(35) *LF 3
K exh [A or B]
= K(A∨B)∧K¬(A∧B)ALT = {. . . , KexhA, KA, KexhB, KB,. . . }
7 Epistemic Transparency
With these basics in place we can check the predictions of the new theory for our
original minimal pair, repeated below:
(36) a. Mary drank some of the beers. = SOME
b. Mary drank some or all of the beers. = SOME OR ALL
In parallel to the simple disjunction just reviewed, there are two ET-licensed LFs for
the simple sentence SOME:
(37) LF 1
exh K SOME
= K(SOME)∧¬K(ALL)
3 Note that both LFs entail ignorance about the disjuncts, i.e., ¬K(A)∧¬K(¬A)∧¬K(B)∧¬K(¬B).
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(38) LF 2
K exh SOME
= K(SOME)∧K¬(ALL)
Thus, just like a simple disjunction, the sentence SOME is predicted to either have an
uncertainty implicature or a scalar implicature. In this the theory makes the same
prediction as the Neo-Gricean pragmatic theory.
Now we can turn to the predictions for the complex structure in (36b). Recall first
that Hurford’s Constraint forces us to adjoin exh within the first disjunct. Importantly,
among the structures that satisfy HC, Epistemic Transparency will rule out all but
one:
(39) LF 1
exh2 K [[exh1 SOME] or ALL]
We will compute the denotation of this LF step by step. First, I assume uncontrover-
sally that the embedded exhaustivity operator exh1 adds the negation of ALL to the
meaning of its prejacent; the denotation of the embedded proposition is thus:
(40) JK [[exh1 SOME] or ALL]K=
K((SOME ∧¬ALL)∨ALL) = K(SOME)
The next step is to check which alternatives exh2 can exclude. Given the meaning of
exh2’s prejacent, these are the following:
(41) a. ALT2 = {K exh1SOME, K ALL, K SOME}
b. IE2 = {K exh1SOME, K ALL}
The denotation of (42) is thus the following:
(42) LF 1
exh2 K [[exh1 SOME] or ALL]
= K(SOME)∧¬K(SOME ∧¬ALL)∧¬K(ALL)
= K(SOME)∧¬K(¬ALL)∧¬K(ALL)
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(43) Matrix K Theory: Simple vs. Complex Structures
a. Simple Structure: W
i. exh K W
= K(W)∧¬K(S)
ii. K exh W
= K(W)∧K(¬S)
b. Complex Structure: W or S
i. exh2 K [[exh1 W ] or S]
= K(W)∧¬K(S)∧¬K(¬S)
Thus, the theory differs from Fox’s grammatical theory of scalar implicature in that
only the complex, but not the simple structure is predicted to entail a true ignorance
implicature about the stronger alternative S.
There is one last step missing in this argument, however. While the LF in (42)
satisfies Epistemic Transparency, we have not shown yet that no other structure does.
Given that we still assume Hurford’s Constraint as part of the theory at this point,
there are two other possible LFs for the complex sentence, given below. As we will
see, both are ruled out by the principle of ET:
(44) LF 2
K [[exh1 SOME] or ALL]
= K(SOME) (s. (40))
This LF does not entail an epistemic attitude about the alternative ALL and is
therefore ruled out by ET. As the reader can check for herself, an exhaustivity
operator just below K will be vacuous, so that the resulting LF will likewise violate
ET. LF 1 is indeed the only predicted structure for the complex sentence — given
that Hurford’s Constraint is assumed to be valid.
In sum, here are the predictions of the grammatical and the Matrix K theory (since
the Neo-Gricean theory faces an independent problem with complex structures, as
reviewed above, I will limit the comparison to these two here.):
(45) Matrix K Theory
a. W
Uncertainty Implicature ¬K(S), Scalar implicature K(S)
b. W or S
Ignorance Implicature ¬K(S) ∧ ¬K¬(S)
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(46) Grammatical cum pre-Neo-Gricean Theory
a. W
Ignorance Implicature ¬K(S) ∧ ¬K¬(S), Scalar implicature K¬(S)
b. W or S
Ignorance Implicature ¬K(S) ∧ ¬K¬(S)
At this point it becomes important to empirically check these subtle differences.
Consider the following contrasts:
(47) a. Mary had a sandwich or a cookie.
b. ✓ Are you saying you don’t know which she had?
The question targets the ignorance implicature about the disjuncts (e.g., ¬KCOOKIE∧ ¬K¬(COOKIE), which are entailed by the semantic meaning in the Matrix K theory
and a pragmatic implicature under the grammatical theory. Note that the grammatical
theory predicts that a simple disjunction A OR B as in (47a) may also give rise to
an ignorance implicature about the conjunction (see (46a) in (46a) above; this is
because of the two symmetric alternatives A AND B and A AND B AND NOT BOTH).
However this implicature behaves differently under the same conditions:
(48) a. Mary had a sandwich or a cookie.
b. # Are you saying you don’t know whether she had both?
c. # Are you saying she might have had both?
The Matrix K theory on the other hand doesn’t predict the ignorance implicature
in question to be entailed, as shown in (45). Thus, while the contrast between (47)
and (48) is unexpected under the grammatical theory, it is predicted by the Matrix K
theory. Second, consider now the behavior of complex structures:
(49) a. Mary had a sandwich or a cookie or both.
b. ✓ Are you saying you don’t know whether she had both?
c. ✓ Are you saying she might have had both?
The contrast between the simple (48) and the complex (49) is again predicted by the
Matrix K, but not the grammatical theory: the latter, but not the former structure
entails ignorance about the conjunction. Though these facts deserve more discussion,
I will confine myself to pointing them out here.
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3 Deriving Hurford’s constraint
In the last section we saw that the Matrix K theory offers an empirical advantage over
the two standard theories of implicature. In this section we will see that the theory
also allows us to get rid of Hurford’s constraint. As the constraint is stipulative, this
is an important improvement.
Intuitively, Hurford’s constraint should fall out as a corollary of Grice’s Brevity.
This is because disjunctions in which one disjunct entails the other are semantically
equivalent to the weaker disjunct (example from Fox & Spector (2009/2013)):
(50) #Mary owns a dog or a German Shepherd.≡ Mary owns a dog.
Given this equivalence, the second disjunct is adding syntactic complexity without
any semantic effect. I propose the following principle to formalize this — again
using Katzir’s notion of structural complexity:
(51) Efficiency
An LF φ is ruled out if there is a distinct competitor ψ such that
a. ψ ∈ ALT(φ)
b. JψK = JφK
Consider first what Efficiency would predict for the complex structures W OR S
we have discussed above. In a theory without Matrix K, the constraint would
rule out these structures even under the parse with local exh (i.e., the LF which
Hurford’s constraint would necessitate, containing an embedded exh in the weaker
disjunct). Generally, the felicity of these complex structures will be problematic for
any formalization of Brevity in terms of equivalence with a sub-constituent, as the
structure below illustrates:
(52) φ
exh1 α
SOME
or ALL
Since JφK = JαK and α ∈ ALT (φ ), (52) would be ruled out just like the actually
infelicitous (50).
Let us now check how Efficiency works within the theory proposed here. To
anticipate the result, all but the following LFs for the complex W OR S will be ruled
out (illustrated here for SOME OR ALL but as before the results carry over to A OR B
OR BOTH):
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(53) exh2 K [[exh1 SOME] or ALL]]
= K(SOME) ∧ ¬K(ALL) ∧ ¬K ¬(ALL)
The structural alternatives against which this LF competes are shown below, together
with their denotations:
(54) ALT = {K exh1 W , K S, exh2 K W , . . . }
= {[K(W ∧K(¬S)], K(S), [K(W)∧¬K(S)], . . . }
Since no alternative LF is equivalent to (52), the structure therefore satisfies Ef-
ficiency. What about other possible LFs for [W OR S]? Recall that admissible
structures also have to satisfy the principle of Epistemic Transparency. This leaves
the following LFs:
(55) exh K [SOME OR ALL]
= K(SOME)∧¬K(ALL)
This LF is empirically inadequate, but it does satisfy ET: the alternatives about which
an epistemic attitude has to be entailed are just the singleton set {ALL}, and the LF
entails that the speaker is not certain about this alternative. Consider Efficiency,
however. The competing LFs are given below:
(56) ALT = {exh K SOME, . . . }
= {K(SOME)∧¬K(ALL)}
The meaning of this simpler alternative is equivalent to (55), which ruled out this
structure. There is only one other structure which would be licensed by Epistemic
Transparency:
(57) K exh [SOME OR ALL]
= K(SOME)∧K(¬ALL)
However, Efficiency correctly rules out this structure, as it is equivalent to a simpler
alternative LF:
(58) ALT = {K exh SOME}
= {K(SOME)∧K(¬ALL)}
In sum, together with Epistemic Transparency, the principle of Efficiency allows us
to get rid of Hurford’s constraint. Only the LF in (53) is predicted to be licensed: the
ignorance implicatures it entails make it non-equivalent to any simpler LF.
In this section we offered a formalization of Grice’s Brevity maxim. In the Matrix
K theory, the proposed principle of Efficiency predicts that complex structures W
OR S are licensed only under a reading which entail ignorance about S. In the
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previous section we saw that there is empirical evidence which corroborates this.
What remains to be done is to verify if the theory as defined so far can be extended
to complex structures like (50) which are infelicitous. This will be the topic of the
next section.
4 Extending the theory to infelicitous complexity
So far we have discussed complex structures of the form W OR S which are felicitous.
Under the theory proposed here, they are licensed because they are efficient in
expressing a meaning which no simpler structure could express. Their distinctive
feature are ignorance implicatures. However, some complex structures in which one
disjunct entails the other are in fact infelicitous (repeated from (50)):
(59) # Mary owns a dog or a German Shepherd.
The infelicitous cases differ from the felicitous ones in that the entailment relation
between the (surface) disjunct is contextual: that Fido is a German Shephard entails
Fido is a dog is not a logical fact. I will use the following notation to indicate
contextual or world-knowledge based entailment:
(60) Fido is a German Shepherd ⊧WK Fido is a dog
Though there isn’t a logical relation between the two propositions, asserting a weaker
(or, less specific) sentence can give rise to an inference about the corresponding
stronger (or, more specific) sentence. Here I hypothesize that this inference can be
modeled as an implicature (Grice 1975, Matsumoto 1995, Singh 2008):
(61) Where is Mary?
She is in France↝ ¬ K (She is in l), l a city in France
This uncertainty implicature arises in contexts in which city-level specificity is at
stake, i.e., in contexts in which Mary’s current city is the desired information. The
observation is quite general. Using a specificity level below n in contexts in which
n-level specificity is required can result in uncertainty implicatures, but importantly,
never in scalar implicatures:
(62) Where is Mary?
She is in France↝̸ K ¬ (She is in l), l a city in France
To derive this, I follow Singh (2008) in making the following assumption:
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(63) Specificity AlternativesALT (FRANCE) = {Paris, Marseille, Lyon, . . . }
How does this account for the absence of scalar implicatures with specificity-based
alternatives? Assume the alternatives of (61) could be given by the singleton set
{Mary is in Paris}. Exhaustifying below K would then predict the missing scalar
implicature:
(64) K exh [Mary is in France]
= K (mary is in france) ∧ K¬(mary is in paris)
Take on the other hand the full set of alternatives including all cities in France
(assume that every location in France is part of a city). Exhaustification below K
yields the following result now:
(65) K exh [Mary is in France]
= K (mary is in france) ∧ K¬(mary is in paris) ∧ K¬(mary is in marseille) ∧
. . . ⊧ 
Before considering what this semantic denotation amounts to, there is a crucial
assumption which we need to make explicit first. To be able to derive (65) at all,
exhaustification needs to be blind to world-knowledge, e.g., facts about city locations
or German Shepherd genetics — otherwise, the alternatives would not be innocently
excludable. This is an assumption defended in Fox & Hackl (2006); Singh (2008);
Magri (2009) on the basis of independent considerations:4
(66) Blindness
Innocent Exclusion avoids logical but not contextual inconsistency
Having made explicit that and how (67) comes about, let us now check what the
consequences are. Exhaustification below K will be possible in the grammar, but
the meaning computed semantically is problematic when interpreted in context: it
ascribes to the speaker the belief that Mary is in France but not at any location in
France. This I argue will ultimately lead the hearer to re-parse the sentence as below:
(67) exh K [Mary is in France]
= K (mary is in france) ∧ ¬K(mary is in paris) ∧ ¬K(mary is in marseille) ∧
. . .
4 It should be noted that the infelicity of Hurford disjunctions like (59) can be derived in the present
system even without Blindness. The reason is that, though possible LFs will no longer give rise to
inconsistent implicatures, they will all violate the principle of Efficiency.
592
Deriving Hurford’s Constraint
This accounts for the observed uncertainty implicature in contexts like (61) above,
as well as for the systematic absence of the scalar implicatures as illustrated in (62).
Let us now return to the main concern of this section, namely, complex sentences
in which on disjunct contextually entails the other. Adding Blindness in (66), and the
assumption about Specificity scales in (63), any possible LF for these sentences will
either be inconsistent in the way (67) is, or ruled out by the principles of Epistemic
Transparency and/or Efficiency.
To show this, we can start with a very simple LF:
(68) LF 1
K [Mary is in France or in Paris]
= K(FRANCE)
As before I will use an abbreviation, FRANCE OR PARIS, in what follows. The LF
above violates both of the two central principles. It doesn’t entail an attitude about
the alternatives {PARIS, MARSEILLE, . . . }, as can easily be read off (68). Secondly,
it is also equivalent to its simpler alternative KFRANCE, thereby violating Efficiency.
Let us look at structures which satisfy ET now.
(69) LF 2
K exh [FRANCE OR PARIS]
= K(FRANCE) ∧ K¬(FRANCE ∧ PARIS) ∧ K¬(MARSEILLE) ∧ . . .
Note that FRANCE ∧ PARIS is contextually equivalent to PARIS. (69) is therefore
contextually equivalent to (65), repeated below. As this is a simpler alternative, (69)
will be ruled out by Efficiency, in addition to being inconsistent when interpreted
relative to world knowledge:
(70) ALT ((69)) = {K exh FRANCE, . . . }
= K(FRANCE) ∧ K¬(PARIS) ∧ K¬(MARSEILLE). . . = J(65)K
8 Efficiency
What happens if exh is adjoined above K? This will avoid the contextual contradiction
of (70), viz., that the speaker is certain that Mary is in France and also certain that
she is not at l, for all locations in France. But the corresponding LF is ruled out by
Efficiency:
(71) LF 3
exh K [FRANCE OR PARIS]
= K(FRANCE) ∧ ¬K(PARIS) ∧ ¬K(MARSEILLE) ∧ . . .
This semantic denotation will not be inconsistent when interpreted in context: a
speaker may actually be certain that Mary is in France without being certain about
any more specific place. The only problem with (71) is that this meaning could be
expressed more efficiently with one of its competitor LFs, shown below:
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(72) ALT ((71)) = {exh K FRANCE, . . . }
= K(FRANCE) ∧ ¬K(PARIS) ∧ ¬K(MARSEILLE). . . = J(71)K
8 Efficiency
There is one more LF which should be checked, namely, the structure which in
SOME OR ALL was predicted to be licensed. It is given below:
(73) LF 4
exh2 K [[exh1 FRANCE] OR PARIS]
To compute the meaning of this LF, the first step is to compute the meaning of the
prejacent of exh2; JexhFRANCEK was already given in (70) above:
(74) JK [[exh1 FRANCE] OR PARIS]K=
K[(FRANCE ∧ ¬PARIS ∧ ¬MARSEILLE. . . ) ∨ PARIS]
What are the alternatives which exh2 in (76) quantifies over and which of them
are innocently excludable? Recall that exh is blind to the contextual relations
between the alternatives. Therefore, it cannot see that the denotation in (74) is
contextually equivalent to KPARIS (this is because the first disjunct in (74) is a
contextual contradiction). Therefore, one logically innocently excludable alternative
of exh2 will be the following:
(75) ALT2 = {Kexh1FRANCE, KPARIS, K[[exh1FRANCE] AND PARIS]}
IE2 = {KPARIS, . . . }
The meaning of LF 4 will therefore be:
(76) LF 4
exh2 K [[exh1 FRANCE] OR PARIS]
= K[(FRANCE ∧ ¬PARIS ∧ ¬MARSEILLE. . . ) ∨ PARIS] ∧ ¬KPARIS
Semantic computation is now completed and we can factor in world knowledge.
Specifically:
(77) K[(FRANCE ∧ ¬PARIS ∧ ¬MARSEILLE. . . ) ∨ PARIS] ∧ ¬KPARIS⊧WK KPARIS ∧ ¬KPARIS
It is easy to see that this is inconsistent. In sum, then, although LF 4 seems to satisfy
Efficiency and Epistemic Transparency (the only LF to do so), when interpreted
relative to world knowledge it will yield a contradiction.
In sum, we saw that the theory can be extended to infelicitous complex structures
of the form W OR S under two independently motivated assumptions (see (63) and
(66)), which can also account for the specific behavior of specificity-based inferences
594
Deriving Hurford’s Constraint
(see Singh 2008). The predictions that emerge are empirically correct: disjunctions
like DOG OR GERMAN SHEPHERD are infelicitous. In our proposal, this is because
any available structure is either contextually inconsistent or violates the principles of
Efficiency and ET. Thus, we can indeed get rid of Hurford’s constraint, as suggested
in the last section.
5 Conclusion and outlook
This paper offers a new theory of grammatical implicatures and their interaction
with pragmatics. In this new theory, it is possible to derive Hurford’s constraint
from a principle of economy, which I have called Efficiency here. There are several
lines of future research that emerge from this paper. First, the empirical scope of the
principle of Efficiency, and its relation to other cases of seeming redundancy and
to (embedded) exhaustification. Second, a thorough re-examination of the scope of
(Gricean) pragmatics and specifically, its relation to Epistemic Transparency. Third,
a finer-grained characterization of the Matrix K operator, locating it within broader
questions about the semantics and pragmatics of evidential and epistemic operators.
Lastly, a closer look at specificity-based implicatures, including the status of the
Blindness hypothesis, in deriving the apparent absence of scalar implicatures and
presence of uncertainty implicatures.
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